Security Situation West Africa 2024

BURKINA FASO

Persistent Security Challenges in Burkina Faso

Burkina Faso continues to face severe security challenges characterized by extremist violence, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and assaults on security forces and Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (VDPs). Ongoing clashes between Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISSP) have further destabilized the nation, displacing vulnerable populations. The government’s announcement of Rapid Intervention Battalions reflects efforts to strengthen security, but systemic weaknesses and limited resources remain significant hurdles.

Key Developments in December

In December, the security situation worsened, with widespread attacks on security forces and VDPs, IED incidents, and extremist group clashes disrupting governance during a period of political transition. On December 11, during the 64th Independence Day address, the President pledged intensified military operations in critical regions.

On December 6, the President dismissed Prime Minister Apollinaire Tambèla and dissolved the government without explanation. Rimtalba Ouédraogo, a close ally of Captain Ibrahim Traoré, was appointed Prime Minister two days later. Presenting his policy agenda on December 27, Ouédraogo prioritized improving security, aiding displaced populations, and advancing military self-reliance through a domestic defense industry. Collaborative efforts with Mali and Niger under the Accra Initiative were also emphasized.

The government plans to deploy five Rapid Intervention Battalions in sensitive areas to counter armed groups and restore stability, reinforcing its commitment to national security.

Regional Security Incidents

• Boucle du Mouhoun Region: FDS operations (December 10–17) in Sadigan, Borekuy, and other areas resulted in significant casualties among armed groups. A December 30 clash in Barani led to fatalities among joint FDS/VDP forces.
• Northern Region: VDP posts in You and Touba were attacked, resulting in fatalities. On December 29, airstrikes in Sim targeted armed groups.
• Sahel Region: Attacks on FDS/VDP positions occurred in Sebba and Tin-Akoff, with significant casualties reported during airstrikes on December 19 and 21.
• Eastern Region: Incidents in Nagaré and Manni targeted VDP positions, while extremist threats in Kompienga prompted evacuations.

IED attacks were widespread, particularly in the South-West, North, and Sahel regions. These attacks disrupted transport routes, hindered military logistics, and endangered humanitarian aid efforts.

Extremist Activity and Clashes

JNIM and ISSP clashes, notably in Soukoundou on December 28, resulted in ISSP casualties and equipment seizures. In the East, threats forced evacuations in Kompienga, while JNIM claimed responsibility for two IED attacks in the Cascades and Hauts-Bassins regions on December 28–29.

Counter-Trafficking Operations

Security forces intercepted significant amounts of narcotics and illegal gold shipments, highlighting the interplay between extremism and organized crime. Authorities seized 28.6 kilograms of gold in Bittou on December 17, valued at over $2.3 million, amid concerns that extremist groups exploit such activities to finance operations.

Structural Challenges

Persistent violence against security forces and VDPs reveals systemic vulnerabilities in Burkina Faso’s security apparatus. Insufficient training, inadequate resources, and limited coordination undermine the effectiveness of volunteer forces. Additionally, the use of IEDs by extremist groups exacerbates instability, disrupting military operations and civilian access to essential services.

Conclusion

Despite intensified military efforts and government restructuring, Burkina Faso’s security landscape remains precarious. Extremist activity, resource constraints, and structural weaknesses continue to challenge stabilization efforts, necessitating comprehensive strategies to address governance, security, and humanitarian needs.

LIBERIA

December Protests Expose Political Instability in Liberia

Violent Protests and Mass Arrests

Protests erupted outside the Liberian House of Representatives, turning violent and resulting in over 70 arrests. The convergence of multiple grievances, including political dissatisfaction, economic hardship, and delayed salaries, fueled tensions and highlighted growing instability. Demonstrators criticized the government’s perceived inaction, with political decisions becoming a focal point for discontent.

Legislative Clashes and Accusations of Bias

In December 2024, clashes within Liberia’s House of Representatives between the opposition Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC) and the majority Unity Party (UP) prompted police intervention. Reports of injuries among lawmakers led to accusations that the National Police were biased in the ongoing conflict over the Speakership. The turmoil further underscored divisions within the government.

"White Tuesday" Demonstration

On December 16, 2024, citizens gathered outside the Capitol Building in Monrovia for the "White Tuesday: A Day for Justice" protest. Organized to address the administration's shortcomings, the protest attracted diverse groups, including student unions demanding overdue stipends, advocates for economic relief, and healthcare workers calling for unpaid salaries and improved conditions. Protesters in white clothing voiced dissatisfaction with corruption and alleged violations of the rule of law under President Joseph N. Boakai's administration, with some calling for his resignation.

Capitol Building Fire

A day after the protests, a fire broke out in the Capitol Building, destroying the main parliamentary chamber. While the cause remains under investigation, arrests have been made amid speculation of arson. The incident added fuel to an already volatile situation.

Escalating Violence During Protests

On December 17, police reportedly used tear gas to disperse protesters who breached designated no-protest zones. The ensuing chaos led to injuries and further arrests. Unconfirmed allegations of security forces using live ammunition were denied by authorities. Among those summoned for questioning over social media comments related to the fire were Speaker Jonathan Fonati Koffa and MP Frank Saah Foko, both of whom denied involvement.

CDC Condemnation and Accusations

The CDC issued a statement condemning the government's handling of protests, accusing President Boakai's administration of using undemocratic methods to suppress dissent. The statement also criticized alleged intimidation, arbitrary dismissals, and arrests under the current administration.

Speakership Struggles Deepen Political Deadlock

Speaker Koffa narrowly survived an ousting attempt in October 2024, attributed to his audit of financial mismanagement within the House. However, allegations of corruption and budget manipulation against Koffa have led to boycotts by opposing lawmakers, disrupting legislative sessions. The Supreme Court ruled in November that attendance could not be enforced, further entrenching the impasse. Meanwhile, a parallel session of lawmakers appointed a new Speaker, Richard Koon, intensifying the standoff.

Corruption Allegations and Public Dissatisfaction

President Boakai's campaign promises to combat corruption have come under scrutiny, with critics alleging that investigations into financial misconduct have stalled. Reports of ministers enriching themselves with public funds and refusing to declare assets have fueled public anger. Bribery allegations in the attempted removal of Speaker Koffa are under investigation, with claims of $750,000 funneled through government agencies to influence lawmakers.

Economic grievances compound public dissatisfaction. Rising mobile data costs and unpaid wages for essential workers, including healthcare personnel, exacerbate hardships in a country reliant on mobile connectivity for communication and financial transactions.

MALI

JNIM Blockade in Léré - Timbuktu Region

In Mali, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) has imposed a blockade on Léré village and destroyed key bridges in the Timbuktu region. These actions have significantly hindered humanitarian access and supply routes from southern Mali and Mauritania. With improved weather conditions and reduced flooding, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) have escalated airstrikes and ground operations in northern and central Mali, targeting JNIM positions as part of broader counterinsurgency efforts. These operations have resulted in casualties, arrests of extremist elements, and increased violence, leading to a rise in civilian fatalities and displacements from rural communities to larger population centers.

Events in Léré and Surrounding Areas

At the end of November, JNIM declared a blockade on Léré village, located approximately 100 km west of Niafunké in the Timbuktu region. On December 11, presumed JNIM militants destroyed the Nounou bridge, located 20 km west of Niafunké in Soboundou commune, further restricting movement in the region. On December 13, JNIM fighters abducted a local official from Léré along the Léré-Dianké route in Niafunké cercle. The official was held for nearly two weeks before being released on December 25.

In response, FAMa intensified offensive operations targeting JNIM positions. A mid-December operation southwest of Léré resulted in the deaths of two suspected JNIM members and the seizure of weapons and equipment. On December 25, another operation in Léré led to the deaths of seven suspected militants and the confiscation of additional arms and ammunition.

FAMa also arrested several individuals suspected of collaborating with JNIM. These included three arrests in Timbuktu city’s Abaradjou district, eight in Ber commune, and one in Soumpi commune in Niafunké cercle.

JNIM’s Strategy of Isolation and Control

The blockade of Léré and the destruction of critical infrastructure, such as the Nounou bridge, are key components of JNIM’s strategy to disrupt FAMa/FMP (Malian Armed Forces and their partners) movements and enforce control over local communities. By isolating villages, JNIM imposes its interpretation of Sharia law, collects taxes (zakat), and asserts itself as the primary provider of security for vulnerable populations.

Taxation of goods, especially during blockades, generates significant revenue for JNIM while restricting resupply routes from Mauritania and southern Mali. This has severely affected Timbuktu and nearby areas, including Nampala and Dioura in the Ségou region. By cutting off supply lines, JNIM disrupts local economies, dominates resources, and increases reliance on its authority, solidifying its control over strategic trade routes.

The targeted destruction of infrastructure, including bridges and telecommunications systems, further undermines state logistical capabilities. This strategy disrupts military operations, obstructs humanitarian aid, and isolates communities. Kidnapping local officials complements this approach, discouraging cooperation with state authorities and serving as a negotiation tool.

Broader Regional Implications

JNIM’s tactics in Mali reflect a broader regional strategy aimed at consolidating control and exploiting porous borders for cross-border operations, logistics, and recruitment. For instance, the ongoing blockade of Djibo in Burkina Faso, which began in early 2022, mirrors the approach seen in Léré. These actions demonstrate JNIM’s ability to enforce territorial control, disrupt humanitarian aid, and undermine state authority across the Sahel.

In October 2024, a senior JNIM leader toured the Niger-Burkina Faso border area, underscoring the group’s confidence and its efforts to strengthen alliances, coordinate operations, and consolidate control in contested regions. In November 2024, JNIM announced plans to intensify operations in urban centres in both Mali and Burkina Faso, signalling an expansion of its focus beyond rural dominance to urban areas.

FAMa’s Counteroffensive

In December, FAMa launched an extensive campaign of airstrikes and ground operations targeting insurgent positions in Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, Ménaka, Central Mali, and Ségou. These actions aim to dismantle JNIM’s infrastructure and curtail its growing influence, though they have also contributed to heightened violence and civilian displacement.

MAURITANIA

Arrests and Disinformation Heighten Tensions in Eastern Mauritania

In early December, a Malian military operation and subsequent arrests in a village near the Mauritania-Mali border sparked heightened tensions. Disinformation about the incident on social media, compounded by a lack of official communication from Mauritanian authorities, has amplified insecurity among communities on both sides of the border. These developments risk further destabilizing the already fragile security situation in eastern Mauritania.

Incident on 10 December

On 10 December, Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), accompanied by Africa Corps (former known as Wagner Group) operatives, reportedly entered the village of Laghdaf near the border, detained 15–18 Mauritanians, and transported them to Lampala, Mali. During their time in the village, Africa Corps operatives reportedly seized six vehicles and looted shops. The detained individuals were released at the Dweinkara border crossing the following day.

Border Demarcation Challenges

Although Laghdaf lies within Malian territory, its residents often identify as Mauritanian due to a long-standing Mauritanian presence in the area. Similar disputes affect 11 other villages along the poorly defined border. The unclear demarcation exacerbates tensions between the two countries and complicates governance.

This border region, encompassing Mauritania’s Hodh el-Chargui (HEC) and Mali’s Koulikoro and Segou regions, is home to nomadic populations who regularly cross the border for grazing and trade. These activities blur the boundary’s practical significance, making the area prone to conflict.

Military Operations and Increased Strain

Malian military operations targeting jihadist groups such as JNIM and Tuareg rebels from the FLA have intensified tensions in the area. These actions strain relationships between local communities and security forces, creating a more volatile environment. Reports of human rights abuses by FAMa and their Wagner partners, including abductions and looting, further contribute to local unease.

Lack of Official Communication

In 2024, similar incidents occurred in April, May, and November, involving FAMa and Africa Corp troops entering border villages, allegedly detaining residents and seizing property. Mauritanian authorities issued strong statements in response, particularly in the lead-up to presidential elections. However, their muted response to the December incident has fueled speculation and facilitated the spread of disinformation.

Unconfirmed reports suggest that the swift release of detainees from Laghdaf was achieved through high-level communication between Mauritanian and Malian officials. Nevertheless, the absence of public statements has eroded trust in the authorities’ ability to manage cross-border issues and ensure the safety of border communities.

Spread of Disinformation

Disinformation has proliferated on social media, exacerbating tensions. A TikTok video falsely claimed that Mauritania’s army bombed a Malian military outpost, killing 69 Malian soldiers and 10 Mauritanian civilians. The video, later debunked by Radio France Internationale (RFI), was filmed during an unrelated fuel tanker explosion in Bamako on 30 October 2024.

The viral video originated from an account with over 250,000 followers, known for spreading inflammatory and misleading content about Mauritania’s relations with Mali. With traditional media outlets like RFI blocked in Mali, many in the border region rely on platforms like TikTok, Facebook, and WhatsApp for news. This reliance, combined with limited fact-checking awareness, makes disinformation highly effective and dangerous.

Growing Concerns Among Border Populations

The December incident, combined with increased military activity in Mali, has prompted some border residents to move deeper into Mauritania for safety. Refugees arriving in Hodh el-Chargui since September 2023 have cited alleged atrocities by FAMa and Wagner forces as their reason for fleeing. These dynamics intensify fears and distrust among local populations.

The tensions have disrupted traditional nomadic migration patterns, with herders delaying their seasonal move into Mali. This prolonged presence of nomadic groups in eastern Mauritania strains local resources such as grazing land and water, increasing the potential for disputes. Disrupted migration also impacts livestock trade and the livelihoods of pastoralist communities reliant on cross-border access.

NIGER

Escalation of Extremist Violence and Broader Instability in Niger

The security situation in Niger continues to deteriorate, marked by escalating extremist violence in regions such as Tillabéri and Diffa and broader instability in Tahoua and Agadez, fueled by criminal networks. Extremist groups, including the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal-Jihad (JAS), are intensifying attacks on civilians, security forces, and critical infrastructure, including the Niger-Benin pipeline. Vital routes like the Dori-Téra-Niamey corridor remain particularly vulnerable, exposing personnel to risks such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes, and movement restrictions.

Key Regional Challenges

Tillabéri Region: Heightened Extremist Activity

Tillabéri has become a hotspot for extremist violence, including a series of deadly attacks:

• 05 December: Armed elements ambushed a civilian goods convoy near Téra, killing 21 civilians.
• 10 December: ISGS attacked a military position in Chatoumane, resulting in 10 soldier fatalities, 7 injuries, and 26 extremist deaths. Conflicting reports also claimed an attack on Chatoumane’s market, later refuted by the government, leading to media suspensions and lawsuits over misinformation.
• 12–14 December: Coordinated attacks on Libiri and Kokorou near the Burkina Faso border killed 39 civilians.
• 20 December: An ambush near Karey-Goussou left 4 soldiers dead and 10 injured.
• 22 December: Two IED attacks on military convoys near Gotheye and Guidaré claimed 3 soldiers' lives.

Extremist groups such as JNIM and ISGS exploit the region’s strategic location at the tri-border area (Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali), targeting infrastructure and disrupting key transit routes like the Dori-Téra-Niamey corridor, critical for trade and humanitarian operations.

Diffa Region: Persistent Extremist Threats

In Diffa, ISWAP and JAS activities maintain a climate of insecurity:

• 09 December: Nine fishermen were executed near Bosso, followed by an ultimatum for civilians to vacate the area.
• Throughout December, incidents of kidnapping and cattle theft in Gueskerou and Nguigmi further destabilized the region, exacerbating economic and social challenges.

Diffa’s proximity to the Lake Chad Basin enables cross-border extremist operations, undermining security forces and humanitarian efforts. These activities disrupt livelihoods, increase reliance on aid, and complicate regional counterterrorism strategies.

Tahoua and Agadez Regions: Criminal Networks

These regions face ongoing challenges from criminal networks targeting infrastructure and trade:

• 30 December: Armed groups attacked the Niger-Benin pipeline near Mountséka, disrupting operations.
• Throughout December: Reports of smuggling and theft, particularly around transit hubs, were prevalent. Security forces intensified operations, including dismantling a clandestine mining site near Assamaka and seizing narcotics linked to drug trafficking.

The adaptability of these networks, coupled with governance weaknesses, continues to undermine state efforts to stabilize these regions.

Broader Impacts and Strategic Implications

Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

The Niger-Benin pipeline has become a recurring target for sabotage, compounding economic challenges amid border closures. Attacks on critical infrastructure lead to logistical disruptions, rising costs, and public dissatisfaction due to shortages and inflation.

Overstretched Security Forces

Niger’s security forces face mounting pressure as extremist groups exploit porous borders and governance gaps. Limited resources and ongoing casualties strain their capacity, complicating efforts to contain groups like JNIM and ISGS. Joint operations under the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) remain limited in scope, focusing primarily on the Liptako-Gourma border area.

Conclusion

Niger’s security landscape remains precarious, with extremist violence and criminal activity destabilizing key regions. While coordinated counterterrorism and regional strategies offer some hope, long-term stability requires addressing governance weaknesses, enhancing border security, and strengthening economic resilience.