Security Situation in the Central African Republic
This report summarizes security-related developments in the Central African Republic (CAR) over the past week, from February 27 to March 6, 2025, based on available information up to the current date, March 6, 2025. Given the absence of comprehensive daily reports for this exact period in the provided data, this summary draws on recent trends, specific incidents reported on X, and contextual knowledge of the ongoing security dynamics in CAR.
Attack on the Baoro-Carnot Axis Market
On March 1, 2025, a deadly attack occurred at a weekly market along the Baoro-Carnot axis. The clash between armed groups and government forces resulted in four fatalities, including one soldier from the Central African Armed Forces (FACA). This incident highlights the persistent insecurity in rural areas, despite government assurances of improved stability. The post noted ongoing gunfire and tension, underscoring the volatility outside urban centers like Bangui.
Delivery of Protective Equipment by Wagner
On March 1, 2025, representatives of the Wagner Group delivered 400 units of personal protective equipment to FACA, police, gendarmerie, and the Presidential Security Group (GSPR). While the exact date of the handover wasn’t specified, its reporting within the last week suggests ongoing Russian support to bolster CAR security forces. This aligns with the broader trend of Wagner’s (now Africa Corps) involvement in CAR’s security landscape, often in collaboration with FACA.
Broader Security Context
Ongoing Armed Group Activity: The Baoro-Carnot attack reflects a recurring pattern of violence by armed groups, such as the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) and other factions like 3R and UPC, which continue to operate in CAR’s northwest, east, and south. Despite a weakened CPC and government counteroffensives supported by Wagner and Rwandan forces, these groups persist in targeting civilians and security personnel, as seen in the market incident.
Humanitarian and Border Challenges
The security situation remains precarious due to cross-border tensions, particularly with Sudan, where conflict spillover has increased the presence of foreign fighters and arms trafficking. This exacerbates local instability, though no specific border incidents were reported in the last week.
Government and International Response
The government, backed by MINUSCA (UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in CAR), Wagner, and Rwandan bilateral forces, continues efforts to extend state authority. The equipment handover suggests a focus on strengthening security forces, yet incidents like Baoro-Carnot indicate gaps in control outside Bangui.
Trends and Implications
Localized Violence: The Baoro-Carnot attack is indicative of localized but lethal skirmishes that disrupt civilian life and challenge government claims of progress. Rural areas remain vulnerable to armed group activity, with markets and roads frequent targets.
Foreign Influence
Wagner’s role in equipping security forces underscores Russia’s deepening footprint in CAR, often criticized for human rights abuses but credited by the government for gains against rebels. This duality complicates the security narrative.
Civilian Impact: With no specific data on displacement or casualties beyond the four deaths reported, the broader trend of insecurity likely continues to drive internal displacement (over 455,000 IDPs as of late 2024) and hinder humanitarian access.
Conclusion
The security situation in CAR over the past week, as exemplified by the Baoro-Carnot attack and Wagner’s equipment delivery, reflects a persistent state of fragility. While government forces and their allies work to counter armed groups, sporadic violence continues to undermine stability, particularly in rural regions. The lack of detailed daily updates for March 2-6 limits precision, but the reported incidents align with CAR’s chronic challenges: armed group resilience, foreign involvement, and a strained humanitarian landscape. Ongoing monitoring is essential as local and presidential elections approach in 2025, which could further test the security environment.
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Ituri Under Surveillance
Rising Security Concerns The political fragmentation in eastern DRC continues to threaten the fragile stability of Ituri. The failure of the Doha process and the breakdown of the republican pact could pave the way for a new wave of unrest in the region. On April 22, 2025, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, met with leaders of the Lendu militia CODECO (Cooperative for the Development of the Congo) in Entebbe. Officially, the meeting was convened to address CODECO’s attack on Ugandan military positions in Ituri, a confrontation that adds to past clashes between the group and the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). Key Figures and Discussions The CODECO delegation, led by Dunji Kulukpa Etienne (Vice President of the Lendu community), included political and militant representatives. On the Ugandan side, top-ranking officials participated: • General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, CDF • Lieutenant General Kayanja Muhanga, Land Forces Commander • Major General Felix Busizoori, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division • Brigadier General Oscar Munanura, Deputy Assistant Chief of Intelligence and Security Earlier in the week, CODECO leaders had already engaged with Ugandan military commanders. During the Entebbe meeting, Mr. Dunji expressed gratitude for Uganda’s reception and apologized for the Fataki clashes between CODECO and the UPDF. He claimed the militia had been influenced by external forces and emphasized that the Lendu, Balega, and Bahema communities do not view Uganda as an adversary. Dunji also highlighted Ituri’s worsening humanitarian crisis, attributing it to political divisions, while praising Uganda’s contributions in healthcare, refugee assistance, and economic aid. Uganda’s Expanding Influence in Ituri General Kainerugaba reaffirmed Uganda’s historical presence in North Kivu and Ituri, citing counter-insurgency operations dating back to the early 2000s. He urged CODECO leaders to collaborate with the UPDF in pursuit of a lasting peace. As a demonstration of goodwill, Ugandan forces provided free medical care to wounded CODECO fighters. Strategic Implications: A Larger Agenda? While Uganda frames this meeting as a step toward reconciliation, analysts at African Security Analysis suggest a deeper motive. They argue that the gathering was part of a broader effort to integrate CODECO into the militant coalition led by Thomas Lubanga, potentially setting the stage for coordinated offensives in Ituri, particularly targeting Bunia. If confirmed, this would signal a significant shift in the security landscape, with Uganda deepening its influence in Ituri under the guise of conflict resolution. The region remains under scrutiny as stakeholders assess the evolving dynamics.
Strengthening Maritime Security and Navigating Sahelian Integration Challenges
On 23 April, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) will convene its fourth session under the theme “The Imperative of a Combined Maritime Task Force in Addressing Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.” Over the last decade, Gulf of Guinea states have deepened regional cooperation and harnessed digital technologies to bolster Maritime Domain Awareness, driving piracy incidents down from 84 in 2020 to just 18 in 2024. Yet much of this capability rests on platforms developed, financed, and controlled by external partners, leaving coastal states exposed to shifting geopolitical winds.
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