When
Location
Topic
25 apr. 2025 07:55
DRC, Rwanda, Uganda
Types of Conflict, Armed groups, Local militias, M23
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A Fragile Ceasefire in Eastern DRC

Between Symbolic Declarations and Harsh Realities

Amid ongoing violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), two nearly identical statements released on April 23, 2025, announced an immediate ceasefire. One was signed in Goma by a member of the rebel group AFC/M23—someone not even officially part of the delegation—and the other was issued by the Congolese government in Kinshasa. Both documents contained the exact same wording, reportedly crafted by Qatari mediators. This dual announcement came just hours after a key meeting in Doha between the Qatari Foreign Minister and the U.S. Special Envoy for Africa, underlining growing international pressure to de-escalate the crisis.

Two Signatures, One Problem: A Lack of Unity

Despite their identical content, the separate signings weaken the political impact of the ceasefire. In Goma, a minor rebel figure—not the delegation leader—signed a statement condemning hate speech and calling for support of the truce. In Kinshasa, the government used the same text but added promises to resettle displaced people and rebuild trust. Crucially, neither version includes a timeline, enforcement mechanism, or consequences for violations—raising doubts in a region that has seen over six failed ceasefires since 2021.

A Pause in Fighting—If Properly Managed

The latest offensive by AFC/M23, which resulted in the capture of Goma, Bukavu, and Walikale, has led to hundreds of deaths and displaced thousands. In theory, a well-enforced ceasefire could allow humanitarian aid to reach those in need and help families return home. But without reliable oversight or lasting mediation, this truce may end up like previous ones—more symbolic than real. Past negotiations promised the release of 700 detainees; only five were freed, and that only after fighting resumed.

Why the Conflict May Reignite

Several factors make a return to violence likely:

  • Deep Distrust: Both sides question each other’s intentions. Rebels feel their recent victories forced the government to negotiate, not diplomacy.
  • Economic Motives & Mercenary Forces: The Congolese government is seen as prioritizing the protection of presidential family assets. Reports suggest American mercenaries have been deployed to safeguard strategic sites like mines and airports, rather than civilians.
  • Ongoing Military Build-Up: A Turkish Air Force cargo plane landed in Kinshasa on April 23, likely bringing in equipment for drones expected by December, indicating plans to recapture rebel-held cities.
  • Rebel Entrenchment: M23 continues to fortify positions in southern Lubero and around Walikale, while securing high ground above Uvira.
  • Tshisekedi’s Political Agenda: The president, in office until 2028, may use the conflict to extend his power. His failure to follow through on dialogue commitments has worsened public trust.
  • Declining Support for M23: In rebel-controlled areas, lack of basic services like justice, banking, and administration weighs heavily on civilians—fueling discontent and giving the government leverage.
  • No Real Path to Political Transition: Long-term peace may require significant political reform, possibly including President Tshisekedi’s resignation—something he has firmly rejected.

A Shift in Power: Rebels Take Control of the Narrative

This ceasefire represents more than just a pause in fighting. For the first time, a rebel-drafted statement was aired live on the national broadcaster, RTNC. What was once labeled terrorism is now being treated with a degree of legitimacy. The State is no longer in full control of the narrative; M23 and its allies have managed to shift the conversation, framing the conflict as one over political legitimacy, not just territory.

Can This Lead to Real Peace Talks?

If both parties act in good faith, the ceasefire could mark the start of genuine negotiations. But this will require confronting some difficult and long-standing issues:

  • The FDLR Dilemma: Kigali sees the FDLR as non-negotiable. President Tshisekedi has admitted his government considered cooperating with this Rwandan rebel group—something Rwanda has used to raise concerns internationally. As the FDLR retreats deeper into the DRC, Kinshasa must decide whether to pursue dialogue or military action.
  • What to Do with M23 Forces: Thousands of fighters have been trained by M23 and its allies. Should a formal disarmament and reintegration program be created? Who would pay for it? And how can lessons from past failures guide a more effective approach?
  • Dealing with Rebel Leadership: M23 leaders face criminal charges in Kinshasa. Should they be granted amnesty, have their assets unfrozen, or be removed from international sanctions lists? If so, on what legal grounds?
  • Resource Sharing: The U.S. Special Envoy has suggested a regional economic plan that guarantees Rwanda’s security while maintaining DRC’s territorial integrity. A shared economic vision could lead to sustainable peace—something already envisioned in past UN resolutions.
  • Revisiting Past Agreements: From the Sun City talks to the Addis Ababa Framework, it's time to revisit and update old peace accords, ensuring all stakeholders are involved in a truly inclusive process.
  • National Unity is Key: Lasting peace requires inclusive dialogue among all Congolese actors. Without this, progress will be superficial—especially when facing a rebel coalition that appears increasingly organized.

Real Peace or Just a Pause?

The Qatari - American diplomatic push may have created a window for dialogue, but without credible verification tools and action on the root causes—governance, economic control, and political transition—this ceasefire risks being nothing more than a brief pause. Only a fully transparent, enforceable agreement, backed by meaningful mediation and oversight, can stop the cycle of violence. Without that, war may simply go underground, masked by hollow declarations of peace.

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DRC, Rwanda, Uganda 25 apr. 2025 07:55

A Fragile Ceasefire in Eastern DRC

Amid ongoing violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), two nearly identical statements released on April 23, 2025, announced an immediate ceasefire. One was signed in Goma by a member of the rebel group AFC/M23—someone not even officially part of the delegation—and the other was issued by the Congolese government in Kinshasa.

DRC, Uganda, Rwanda 23 apr. 2025 11:48

Ituri Under Surveillance

Rising Security Concerns The political fragmentation in eastern DRC continues to threaten the fragile stability of Ituri. The failure of the Doha process and the breakdown of the republican pact could pave the way for a new wave of unrest in the region. On April 22, 2025, Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, met with leaders of the Lendu militia CODECO (Cooperative for the Development of the Congo) in Entebbe. Officially, the meeting was convened to address CODECO’s attack on Ugandan military positions in Ituri, a confrontation that adds to past clashes between the group and the Ugandan People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). Key Figures and Discussions The CODECO delegation, led by Dunji Kulukpa Etienne (Vice President of the Lendu community), included political and militant representatives. On the Ugandan side, top-ranking officials participated: • General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, CDF • Lieutenant General Kayanja Muhanga, Land Forces Commander • Major General Felix Busizoori, Commander of the 4th Infantry Division • Brigadier General Oscar Munanura, Deputy Assistant Chief of Intelligence and Security Earlier in the week, CODECO leaders had already engaged with Ugandan military commanders. During the Entebbe meeting, Mr. Dunji expressed gratitude for Uganda’s reception and apologized for the Fataki clashes between CODECO and the UPDF. He claimed the militia had been influenced by external forces and emphasized that the Lendu, Balega, and Bahema communities do not view Uganda as an adversary. Dunji also highlighted Ituri’s worsening humanitarian crisis, attributing it to political divisions, while praising Uganda’s contributions in healthcare, refugee assistance, and economic aid. Uganda’s Expanding Influence in Ituri General Kainerugaba reaffirmed Uganda’s historical presence in North Kivu and Ituri, citing counter-insurgency operations dating back to the early 2000s. He urged CODECO leaders to collaborate with the UPDF in pursuit of a lasting peace. As a demonstration of goodwill, Ugandan forces provided free medical care to wounded CODECO fighters. Strategic Implications: A Larger Agenda? While Uganda frames this meeting as a step toward reconciliation, analysts at African Security Analysis suggest a deeper motive. They argue that the gathering was part of a broader effort to integrate CODECO into the militant coalition led by Thomas Lubanga, potentially setting the stage for coordinated offensives in Ituri, particularly targeting Bunia. If confirmed, this would signal a significant shift in the security landscape, with Uganda deepening its influence in Ituri under the guise of conflict resolution. The region remains under scrutiny as stakeholders assess the evolving dynamics.

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