Niger Withdraws from the Multinational Joint Task Force
A Strategic National Shift
Niger has announced its withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), a regional force reactivated in 2015 to combat jihadist groups around Lake Chad. This task force, which includes Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Benin, and Niger, was initially established in 1994 to address the growing threats in this strategic region.
Redirecting National Priorities
According to a bulletin broadcast by Radio-télévision du Niger (RTN) on March 29, 2025, Niger's army stated its intention to focus on securing its oil pipeline in the Diffa region, a target of frequent attacks and sabotage. This pipeline, which transports Niger's oil to Benin, is vital to the nation's economy but remains under threat from separatists of the Patriotic Liberation Front (FPL) and terrorist groups such as Lakarawa. Consequently, Niger has reassigned its forces, previously engaged in MNJTF operations under Sector 4, to a new mission named "Nalewa Dolé," aimed at protecting oil facilities in Diffa.
A Fragmenting Coalition
Since its reactivation in 2015, the MNJTF has achieved tactical successes on the ground. However, it has struggled to eradicate the terrorist haven in the Lake Chad basin, which serves as a stronghold for Boko Haram and the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP). The force's inefficacy has been attributed to several factors, including coordination challenges among member states, conflicting strategic goals, and diverging national priorities.
Tensions within the MNJTF escalated following the military coup in Niger in July 2023, straining relations between Niger and Nigeria. Nigeria's condemnation of the coup, accompanied by threats of intervention via ECOWAS (The Economic Community of West African States), disrupted military cooperation and intelligence sharing between the two key players in the force.
Although a brief resumption of military cooperation was announced in August 2024, relations quickly soured again. Niger accused Nigeria of harboring foreign troops, an allegation Nigeria has consistently denied. Meanwhile, Nigeria accused Niger of backing attacks on the pipeline to Benin. Diffa's pipeline infrastructure, central to Niger's oil production, remains under constant threat from armed groups hostile to Niamey.
Implications for the MNJTF
Niger's withdrawal weakens the MNJTF significantly, particularly as other member states, such as Chad, have expressed doubts about their commitment to the force. In October 2024, an attack that killed 40 Chadian soldiers highlighted a lack of coordination and support among partners.
This withdrawal underscores the broader challenges facing regional anti-terrorism efforts: insufficient collaboration among nations to counter a transnational threat, compounded by conflicting national interests. While securing the pipeline is now a top priority for Niger, this strategic shift leaves the Lake Chad basin more vulnerable to terrorist activities.
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